The Establishment and Regulation of the Commercial Security Industry in Kenya and its Constitutionality by Mutonyi, Gerald Peter & Kilongosi, Happi
Traektoriâ Nauki = Path of Science. 2020. Vol. 6, No 11  ISSN 2413-9009 
Section “Law and Security”   1010 
The Establishment and Regulation of the Commercial Security Industry 
in Kenya and its Constitutionality 
 
Gerald Peter Mutonyi 1, Happi Kilongosi 2 
 
1 Kenyatta University 
P. O. Box 43844-00100, Nairobi, Kenya 
2 University of Nairobi 
P. O. Box 30197-00100, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
DOI: 10.22178/pos.64-2 
 
JEL Classification: K40 
 
Received 26.10.2020 
Accepted 28.11.2020 
Published online 30.11.2020 
 
Corresponding Author: 
Gerald Peter Mutonyi 
mutonyig@gmail.com 
 
© 2020 The Authors. This article is licensed 
under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
License  
 Abstract. The commercial security industry's effective establishment 
and regulation have been overlooked in many states, including Kenya. 
The increase of Commercial security firms' involvement in national 
and transnational business resulted in the United Nations drafting the 
Convention on the Regulation, Oversight, and Monitoring of Private 
Military and Security Companies.  
This study examines the Commercial Security Industry in Kenya in 
terms of establishment and regulation, outlining the industry's major 
issues and challenges. The aim was to demonstrate that laws and 
practices relating to registration and regulation of the Commercial 
Security Industry in Kenya are loosely created, weak, and shaky. And 
up to date, the commercial security industry in Kenya is operating in 
contravention of the Constitution. 
Keywords: commercial security; commercial security firms; security; 
laws; regulations. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
After introducing the neoliberal philosophy, 
which was an offshoot of Washington Consensus 
policy, commercialisation hit even areas consid-
ered the exclusive domain of the state, such as 
security. With the trend of commercialising secu-
rity becoming national and international, the 
commercialising of security services gained 
prominence worldwide. In that regard, this in-
vestment sector has influenced and has become 
an area of concern to scholars and policy-makers 
at national and international levels. The commer-
cial security industry (CSI) comprises enterprises 
that offer some policing/security services with a 
profit motive. Commercial security can be de-
scribed as contracted fee-paying services to pro-
tect persons and physical assets [2, 13, 16]. 
In light of this study, the commercial security in-
dustry and private security industry may differ in 
the nature and range of contracts between the 
consumers and providers. Therefore, this study 
will confine itself to the term of the commercial 
security industry. The CSI has been a fast-
developing socio-economic sector, but it seems to 
have been forgotten by policy and law-makers in 
Kenya. There is a complete break between com-
mercial security firms (CSFs) and the regulatory 
framework established to standardise their 
country's activities.  
This paper proposes two main points of views: 
first, that the Constitution of Kenya does not en-
vision commercial actors in the sphere of polic-
ing, consequently sanctioning CSFs to operate in 
Kenya is an unconstitutional allocation of exclu-
sive authorities of the state and a contradiction to 
the 'Weberian model of State' which enjoyed the 
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical vio-
lence [10]. Second, non-effective regulated CSI 
can be compromised by people and groups not 
registered and licensed, hence constituting a 
higher security risk for the country. 
The commercial security industry has been au-
tomated through security associations until late 
2016. After that, the PSRA, No 13 of 2016, paved 
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the way for the formation of an authority to over-
see commercial security practice in Kenya. 
Research Methodology. The study adopted an ex-
planatory research design. It then used three da-
ta collecting methods: library research, internet-
based and scheduled interviews. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Laws of Private Security Industry in Kenya. There 
is a particular piece of legislation or statutory 
(regulatory) authority that is supposed to govern 
the CSI activities. However, the commercial secu-
rity industry is still self-regulating through secu-
rity associations Kenya Security Industry Associ-
ation (KSIA) and Private Security Industry Asso-
ciation (PSRA). After that, the PSRA, No 13 of 
2016, was expected to pave the way for the for-
mation of an authority to oversee the practice of 
commercial Security in Kenya. 
Establishment and Regulation of Commercial Se-
curity Firms. Commercial security firms (CSFs) 
are registered like other business entities as per 
the Companies Act 2015. However, there are no 
special procedural steps the holder of a certifi-
cate of incorporation must fulfil to be permitted 
to provide security services in Kenya. To set up a 
security business should be quite different from 
ordinary commercial enterprises. This is because 
allowing a commercial security firm to operate, 
several security concerns need to be considered. 
In addition to conditions under the Companies 
Act, the applicant must meet other stringent cri-
teria set by the law. 
The foremost concern is that, after a CSF is issued 
with a license, no government institution or 
agency is directly in charge of its operations. Be-
sides, most of the CSFs are founded, owned, and 
operated by current serving members and ex-
members of the civil service, disciplined forces 
most having influential political networks in one 
way or another, thereby blocking any move to-
wards effective regulation of the CSI. For exam-
ple, former Judiciary Chief Registrar Gladys Shol-
lei was accused of having used her influence to 
award a CSF associated with her to earn a gov-
ernment contract []. Coincidentally, she chaired 
the committee on delegated legislation that rec-
ommended the annulment of the Private Security 
Industry Regulations 2019, which the PSRA Au-
thority had intended for the code of practice and 
procedures for the industry []. One of the officials 
of PROSAK a reputable association for security 
practitioners, had this to say: 
"They use their networks to undercut other com-
mercial security firms by offering what is way be-
low market rates, and that way, they pay their 
personnel peanuts, and the repercussion is the de-
livery of poor services from unmotivated guards". 
This approach would indicate that those who 
would be expected to ensure that the industry is 
operating at high moral and professional levels 
are instead derailing the industry to maximise 
their profit margins. The repercussions would be, 
security personnel are inclined in not benefitting 
as rivalry in the market makes security firms to 
reduce what they charge for services rendered 
[1]. In this regard, the commercial security 
guards will not be encouraged to undertake their 
obligations to the best of their abilities. They 
might be compromised to get involved in illegal 
activities like allowing the exit of unauthorised 
goods so that they earn a commission from the 
arrangement. 
This shared practice by most of the CSFs contra-
dicts Victor Vroom's theory of expectancy. A 
worker trusts that the more effort they put in, the 
superior the performance, and with the out-
standing performance, the higher will be the 
payment [17]. It also challenges Abraham 
Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs that 
employment is a significant base of monetary se-
curity. The better the remunerating career is, the 
more monetarily secure an individual becomes 
[6]. It also contradicts another study that com-
mercial security guards should be paid a salary at 
least within the minimum government require-
ment [9].  
The second concern is how these public officials 
draw a line between their commercial policing 
errands (managing their firms) and their public 
policing responsibilities. Instead, there arise sev-
eral complications, such as split loyalty, conflict 
of interest, and the likelihood of using public of-
fices for personal gain. Since CSIs are currently 
supposed to be regulated by the parliament, self-
regulating or by the consumers, within the CSI 
we have politicians who own CSFs and have ac-
cess to information concerning CSI, and this may 
lead to; one misuse of accountability information 
especially where such information is against 
their commercial interests.  
When the owners of a CSF are the same as the 
consumers of service due to their position in 
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Government that makes it possible to award 
their own firms contracts, thereby compromising 
their impartiality in creating and implementing 
decisions relating to the regulation of CSI espe-
cially in delivering strategies or advocating for 
new laws, also, if a CSF owned by a public servant 
engages in somewhat in a scandal, it may dis-
credit the particular officer. Eventually, the pub-
lic's confidence in the public servants may dent 
even further1. Two, they may use confidential 
information against rival firms, and three, for 
blackmailing prospective consumers to agree to 
take their services or shield their consumers' in-
terest. 
The third concern is that the companies Act does 
not make any prohibitions on the activities enter-
ing into when running a security firm. The reper-
cussions are that firms registered as security 
companies are providing services and goods that 
are not related to security include activities like 
supplies of non-security stationery and even 
public transportation of passengers. A director of 
a security firm pointed out that. 
"The industry is competitive and challenging, espe-
cially when you have not been able to penetrate 
and established yourself. That makes some of us 
engage in other activities so as we may be able to 
cater for our sustenance". 
This practice forces the industry to engage in 
businesses that are not their core business. Even 
when any dishonour arises due to the malprac-
tice or noncompliance of that firm on meeting its 
customer obligation, the CSI image is tarnished. 
The citizens will not be convinced that the firm 
was engaged in providing other services and 
goods not related to security, for example, 
housekeeping. 
As we have discussed above, the establishment 
and regulation process has some weaknesses 
compared to other international principles of 
standardising CSFs. The commercialised Security 
industry and its activities in South Africa's Secu-
rity are under a code of conduct for security ser-
vices providers fixed by the Private Security In-
dustry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA): It is the su-
 
1 THE PUBLIC OFFICER ETHICS ACT, 2003 prohibits 
public officers from awarding contracts, or influence 
the award of a contracts, to themselves, their spouse 
or relative, or business associate; engage in any occu-
pation or business which might prejudice their status 
as public servants, and not engage in private business 
during official working hours. 
pervisory arm for the South African PSI set up by 
the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 
56 of 2001. 
In Russia, regulation over CSFs is implemented 
by the ministry of the interior and the prosecutor 
general's office2. In Ukraine, the ministry of the 
interior is in control for the regulation of the 
commercial security industry, including the issu-
ance and withdrawal of licenses. In Georgia, the 
retail security industry is weakly regulated, 
mainly because of the lack of specific CSF legisla-
tion. Therefore, it is practically no likelihood of 
guaranteeing that the principles are upheld 
throughout the industry in Georgia [4]. 
An example of self-regulation in the sector is with 
the British Security Industry Association (BSIA), 
which has taken actions to inspire some mini-
mum principles and is authorised to administer 
the current law on the commercial security in-
dustry. The BSIA develops the regulations, which 
afterwards passes it on to the British Standards 
Institution (BSI) for enhancement as a British 
Standard3. 
There is no national arrangement on regulation 
in the USA as the states differ in a significant way 
in their needs. Some states have no regulatory 
oversight, whereas some states regulate guards 
armed with firearms only [15]. Some use indige-
nous police agencies to control the commercial 
firms, although others encourage the industry to 
self-regulate. 
The Private Security Industry under the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Kenya. The Constitution of 
the Republic of Kenya, Chapter 14, Article 239(4) 
[18] prohibits persons from establishing a mili-
tary, paramilitary, or similar organisation that 
purports to promote and guarantee national se-
curity, except as provided for by the Constitution 
or an Act of Parliament of Kenya.  
 
2 Law of 11.01.1991 on private detective and guarding 
activities in the Russian Federation (amended by Fed-
eral laws of 21.03.2002, 10.01.2003 and 06.06.2005); 
Law on licensing particular types of activities 
(08.08.2001 No  128-fz.), Governmental decree on 
licensing non-governmental (private) guarding and 
detective activities (14.08.2002, No 600), order of the 
Ministry of the Interior regulating the use of fire arms 
(13.04.2005, No 275) as well as on training 
(31.12.1999). 
3 British Security Industry Association-overview 
https://www.bsia.co.uk/Portals/4/Publications/302-
bsia-overview.pdf. 
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It is only the Government that is permissible to 
recruit and preserve any disciplined forces of 
various types for resistance and security on the 
territory and the people. This conception of a 
state's responsibility falls directly in the 'Weberi-
an' model of a condition that maintains a monop-
oly on the legitimate use and allocation of legiti-
mate force. 
The first question to be probed is whether the 
CSFs qualify as armed forces under Article 238? 
Accurately, the CSFs qualify as a disciplined force, 
although not so explicitly stated under Article 
238. This is for the following reasons. First, the 
state action doctrine, the CSFs qualifies as armed 
forces (state actors), not because of the arrange-
ment but the function they perform and legiti-
mise directly or indirectly by the state to fulfil 
public demand for order and security [11]. The 
state action doctrine does not shield persons' 
rights to be free of state control but instead pro-
tects the citizens' right to democratically decide 
the kind of social order they would desire to stay 
in. It is not for the respect of the citizen's rights, 
but the respect for democracy, which has higher 
stakes. 
Second, the arm of the state theory affirms that 
whenever a commercial provider acts as an arm 
of the Government by accomplishing a public call 
for order and security, that commercial supplier 
ought to be held to be a de facto state actor [11]. 
In the Kenyan context, various activities per-
formed by CSFs are more or less comparable to 
those of the state security agencies. For example, 
the prevention of law-breaking, protection of 
people and property, and investigations make 
CSFs an attachment of the state or de facto state 
security agency. Incorporation of commercial 
players in responsibilities, which are the state's 
jurisdiction, makes that player an arm of the 
Government [11]. 
Third, CSFs are abided by the disciplined forces' 
behaviours, cultures, and principles such as sa-
luting, marching, and parades), usage of accesso-
ries of the state security agencies (walkie talkie 
radio sets, whistles, and lanyards), and undergo 
upgraded teachings and exercises which pro-
gram them to have similarities like state security 
agents [7].  
Besides, just like in the disciplined forces, CSFs 
have an established chain of command of duty, a 
culture of loyalty, a set of rituals, beliefs, and 
symbols. This opinion was also held by the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc (amicus 
curiae) in the USA v. Mario Terrell Day4. The con-
tention was whether the commercial security 
guards should be considered state players for the 
4th and 5th Amendments of the USA Constitu-
tion. The amicus curiae responded to that issue 
in the affirmative and consequently pronounced 
that commercial security guards conduct them-
selves more like state security agents than they 
behave like a regular citizen. For instance, they 
have powers to detain persons; they undertake 
searches and freaks; they investigate incidents 
and undertake to uphold law and order. Two, 
commercial security guards are often mistaken 
for state security agents as they tend to use the 
indicia (indications) of authorised power to con-
vince citizens' obedience. Three, commercial se-
curity guards are officially predisposed to look 
and act as police officers5. Four, commercial se-
curity personnel bear the imprimatur (official 
permission) of the state because protecting the 
citizens from internal and external threats is a 
principal obligation of the state6. Therefore, CSFs 
qualify as de facto state security agents because 
they execute some controls that have been by 
tradition associated with sovereignty7.  
The second question is, are the existence of CSFs 
in conformity with the Constitution? Since CSFs 
qualifies as armed forces as discussed above, the 
answer is that commercial security firm's pres-
ence in Kenya is unconstitutional and illegal due 
to the following explanations:  
First, under chapter 14, Article 239(4) of the 
Constitution, only the Government is empowered 
to establish an armed force of any kind as pro-
vided for by the Constitution or an Act of Parlia-
ment of Kenya. The provision asserts that, 
"A person shall not establish a military, paramili-
tary, or similar organisation that purports to pro-
mote and guarantee national security, except as 
provided for by this Constitution or an Act of Par-
liament" [18]. 
 
4 F.3d , 2010 WL 60900 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2010), on Ap-
peal from the United States District Court For the 
Eastern District of Virginia Richmond Division. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Loc. cit. 
7 Justice Rehnquist in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co. (1974) 419 U.S. 345. 
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CSFs as commercial players neither established 
by the state nor reporting to the state are uncon-
stitutional for violating Article 239(4).  
Second, CSFs operate outside the framework of 
the law. They are taking a precede from Tanzania 
where judge Mwalusanya in determining the 
constitutionality of 'traditional army' (sung), held 
them unconstitutional for operating in a vacu-
um8. Therefore, applying judge Mwalusanya's 
formulation on commercial bodies that function 
outside of the legal structure, CSFs come to be 
unconstitutional as they lack the statutory basis 
upon which to operate. The Constitution of the 
United Republic of Tanzania (the Constitution) 
under Article 147 (1 and 2) prohibits individuals, 
organisation, or group of persons except for the 
Government from raising or maintaining an 
armed force of any kind in the United Republic of 
Tanzania for the defence and security of the terri-
tory and the people of Tanzania9. In the South 
African scenario, the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Article 199(3) allows armed or-
ganisations or services such as CSFs to be in 
business but under specific national legislation 
for structure and regulation.  
Third, the Constitution of Kenya does not of any 
kind insinuate the delegation of maintenance of 
security and policing powers to commercial enti-
ties. This premise is supported by the ruling of 
the Israel High Court of Justice in the Human 
Rights Program versus the Minister of Finance 
(alias Academic Center of Law and Business, 
Human Rights Division versus Minister of Fi-
nance)10. In this case, the petitioner asked the 
 
8 Misperesi K. Maingu v. Hamisi Mtongori & 9 Others, 
HC at Mwanza, Civil Case No, 16 of 1988; Geza Geza & 
12 Others v. Isa Hamisi & 11 Others, HC at Mwanza, 
civil Case No. 7 of 1988; Charles Mwita & Another v. 
Kando Mresi & 10 Others, HC at Mwanza, Civil Case 
No. 15 of 1988; Charles Charari Maitari v. Matiko 
Chacha Ghati & 4 Others; and Ngwegwe s/o Sangija & 
3 Others v. R., HC at Mwanza, Criminal Appeal No. 72 
of 1987 [All cases reported in Peter, C.M. & H. Kijo-
Bisimba (2005) Justice and Rule of Law in Tanzania: 
Selected Judgments and Writings of Justice James L. 
Mwalusanya and Commentaries. LHRC]. 
9 The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 
1977. 
10 4(2009) HCJ 2605/05 (Israeli Supreme Court sit-
ting as the High Court of Justice) available at: 
<http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/05/050/026/n39/0
5026050.n39.pdf> (in Hebrew). Seven Judges con-
curred, whilst, Justice Edward Levy dissented, holding 
High Court of Israel to pronounce an Amendment 
to the Prisons Ordinance11, illegal for permitting 
commercialisation of prisons in violation of Arti-
cle 1 of Israel's Basic Law. The High Court of Isra-
el held for the petitioner by declaring prison's 
commercialisation scheme null and void in its 
totality attributable to, one, that conventionally 
the state has incarceration powers as captured 
under the social contract principle. Consequently, 
the state as a voted body and democratically ac-
countable body should hold the monopoly over 
the exercise of controlled power planned to ad-
vance the public's interest, for instance, demo-
cratic mandate theory [5]. The state cannot give 
its legitimate responsibilities of enforcing the law 
and security of the citizen's safety to commercial 
players who are guided by profit-making objec-
tives [5, 12]. The Court rejected the state's rea-
soning that commercialisation (of prisons) is a 
simple economic strategy that cannot tremble 
the fundamentals of the organisation of the Dem-
ocratic Governance and the basic values of the 
legal system [12].  
Fourth and lastly, the security agents in Kenya 
are held to constitutional accountability by Arti-
cle 59(2)(d) of the Kenya National Human Rights 
and Equality Commission. It mandates the com-
mission to monitor, investigate, and report hu-
man rights observance in all spheres of life in the 
Republic, including keeping by the national secu-
rity organs. It is noted that only the security 
agents that we recognised in the Republic of 
Kenya are the national security organs in Article 
239(1), names as the Kenya Defence Forces, the 
National Intelligence Service, and the National 
Police Service. Commercial security firms are not 
mentioned anywhere, thereby alluding to the fact 
that they are not constitutionally recognised. 
Even with the enactment of the Private Security 
Regulation Act (PSRA) No 13 of 2016, the Consti-
tution will still have to be amended to make the 
new entrant of the CSFs legitimate and therefore 
to receive oversight by the Kenya National Hu-
man Rights and Equality Commission. There is an 
argument that commercial security workers 
ought to be held to the Bill of Rights [11]. "Both 
official police and private police functioning as 
arms of the state should be held to constitutional 
standards because they have been legitimised, 
 
that the Court cannot nullify a privatization scheme 
which is yet to be implemented. 
11 Amendment No. 28 of 2004. 
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directly or indirectly, by the state, to fulfil a public 
demand for order and security" [11]. 
From the perspective of the above argument, the 
Act of the Kenya government to permit CSFs to 
be in business violates the legitimate right to se-
curity of citizens and property and therefore 
amounts to the unlawful allocation of public 
powers to commercial actors. Accordingly, com-
mercial security is the foremost frontier of safe-
guarding for the citizen and needs to be well reg-
ulated [8]. 
To legitimise the activities of the CSFs in Kenya, 
the state adopted a model to legitimise them 
through an Act of parliament. Private Security 
Regulation Act (PSRA) No 13 of 2016 to ensure 
that the industry operates responsibly and pro-
fessionally. However, the authority that was en-
visioned to oversee the Act's implementation has 
not had its house in order. It is currently facing a 
hurdle after parliament annulled the regulations 
the authority had proposed to implement the Act. 
In that regard, unless Article 239 of the Constitu-
tion is amended to incorporate other players in 
the security sphere, the existence and operation 
of CSFs in Kenya will be illegal. The only way to 
legalise CSF's activities in Kenya is to constitu-
tionalise them by adopting the South African 
model. In light of those above, the Private Securi-
ty Regulation Act (PSRA) No 13 of 2016 will not 
be perceived as going against Article 239(4) of 
the Constitution. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Kenyan commercial security industry came 
into existence in 1980 due to the neo-liberal poli-
cies that saw the state security agencies being 
under-funded and losing the ability to deliver 
services, including security provision. The guide-
lines then advocated for the liberalisation of in-
ward foreign direct investment and abolition of 
regulations that impede market entry. As a result, 
no law, circular, administrative order, or procla-
mation made official CSF's activities in Kenya. 
Introducing key players such as the CSFs without 
any legislation or regulation was an error that 
needs correction. 
This study evaluated Kenya's commercial securi-
ty industry and concluded that the industry has 
some weaknesses in terms of registration and 
regulation. Above all, the chapter ignites a dis-
cussion about the constitutionality or otherwise 
the legitimacy of CSFs activities in Kenya. Fur-
thermore, laws and regulatory frameworks have 
not kept pace with the expansion of commercial 
security. Other stakeholders would be contented 
that commercial security firms are already being 
held answerable both criminally and civilly by 
their clients. But others have argued that com-
mercial security has to be laid open to the same 
form of democratic controls and accountability as 
the other state security organs in Kenya. There-
fore, the increased 'marketisation of insecurity 
control' in Kenya requires a constitutionalisation 
of the commercial security industry's govern-
ance. 
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